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Abstract 
We compare the performance and risk of a sample of 181 large banks from 15 European countries over the 
1999-2004 period and evaluate the impact of alternative ownership models, together with the degree of 
ownership concentration, on their profitability, cost efficiency and risk. Three main results emerge. First, after 
controlling for bank characteristics, country and time effects, mutual banks and government-owned banks  
exhibit a lower profitability than privately-owned banks, in spite of their lower costs. Second, public sector 
banks have poorer loan quality and higher insolvency risk than other types of banks while mutual banks have 
better loan quality and lower asset risk than both private and public sector banks. Finally, while ownership 
concentration does not significantly affect a bank’s profitability, a higher ownership concentration is associated 
with better loan quality, lower asset risk and lower insolvency risk. These differences, along with differences in 
asset composition and funding mix, indicate a different financial intermediation model for the different 
ownership forms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
A firm’s ownership structure can be defined along two main dimensions. First, the degree 
of ownership concentration: firms may differ because their ownership is more or less 
dispersed. Second, the nature of the owners: given the same degree of concentration, two 
firms may differ if the government holds a (majority) stake in one of them; similarly, a stock 
firm with dispersed ownership is different from a mutual firm. Within the European banking 
industry different ownership structures coexist: privately-owned stock banks (POBs), mutual 
banks (MBs), and government-owned banks (GOBs)1. POBs, in turn, have different degrees 
of ownership concentration. Although their roots are different, large MBs, GOBs, and POBs 
(with different ownership concentration) have typically evolved to a similar full-service 
banking model, thereby competing in the same markets within the same regulatory 
framework. Indeed, these banks are virtually indistinguishable in terms of their range of 
activities.  
The relevance of firms’ ownership structure has been extensively explored in the 
theoretical literature. As far as ownership concentration is concerned, Bearle and Means 
(1932) point out that the separation of ownership and control may create a conflict of 
interests between owners and managers. Moreover, Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that 
the agency costs of deviation from value maximization increase as managers’ equity stake 
decreases and ownership becomes more dispersed. The argument may weaken if the 
dispersed ownership went along with the public trading of the firm’s securities. As pointed 
out by Fama (1980), the signals provided by an efficient capital market about the value of a 
firm’s securities are likely to discipline the firm’s management. Regarding the nature of 
owners, the property rights hypothesis (e.g. Alchian, 1965) suggests that private firms should 
perform more efficiently and more profitably than both government-owned and mutual 
firms. In the case of government-owned firms, as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out, 
                                                 
1
 Hereafter, with the terms private banks and privately-owned banks we refer to banks whose owners are not government 
entities and that have not mutual form. 
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while they are technically “controlled by the public”, they are run by bureaucrats who can be 
thought of as having “extremely concentrated control rights, but no significant cash flow 
rights”. Additionally, political bureaucrats have goals that are often in conflict with social 
welfare improvements and are dictated by political interests. In mutual firms, ownership 
cannot be concentrated as in the case of stock companies (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). 
This may cause inefficiency as the benefits of concentrated ownership are forgone.  
Moving to the empirical literature and restricting the analysis to the banking industry, we 
briefly review previous works on relative performances concerning (i) GOBs, (ii) MBs, and 
(iii) concentrated banks. As far as the relative performance of GOBs is concerned, Altunbas 
et al. (2001), focusing on the German banking industry, find little evidence to suggest that 
POBs are more efficient than GOBs, although the latter have slight cost and profit 
advantages over POBs. Sapienza (2004) focuses on banks lending relationships in Italy, 
comparing the interest rate charged to two sets of companies with identical credit scores 
which are borrowing either from GOBs or POBs, or both. She finds that GOBs tend to 
charge lower interest rates than POBs. By examining the profitability of a large sample of 
banks from both developing and developed countries, Micco et al. (2004) find that in 
industrial countries there is no significant difference between the Return on Assets of GOBs 
and that of similar POBs. Finally, Berger et al. (2005) find that GOBs in Argentina have 
lower long-term performance than that of POBs. 
As far as the relative performance of MBs is concerned, empirical studies provide quite a 
rich set of stylized facts which are useful for evaluating the reasonableness of any theory of 
mutuality. MBs have higher expenses (O’Hara, 1981; Mester, 1989; Gropper and Beard, 
1995; Esty, 1997), lower asset risk (O’Hara, 1981; Fraser and Zardkoohi, 1996; Esty, 1997) 
and lower default risk (Rasmusen, 1988; Cordell et al., 1993; Hansmann, 1996; Fraser and 
Zardkoohi, 1996). However, Altunbas et al. (2001) find that German MBs have slight cost 
and profit advantages over German POBs. Valnek (1999), focusing on the UK banking 
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industry, finds that MBs (mutual building societies) have lower reserves for loan losses and 
make lower provisions for these reserves, have similar return on assets standard deviations 
over time, but exhibit a lower average return on assets (whether or not risk-adjusted) than 
POBs.  
Finally, as far as ownership concentration is concerned, Kwan (2004) compares – on a 
univariate basis – profitability, operating efficiency and risk taking between publicly traded 
and privately held US bank holding companies, finding that publicly traded banks tend to be 
less profitable than privately held similar bank holding companies, since they incur higher 
operating costs, while risk between the two groups is statistically indistinguishable. 
Moreover, several papers (Saunders, et al., 1990; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Houston and 
James, 1995; and Demsetz, et al., 1997) find a significant effect of ownership concentration 
on risk taking, although no consensus exists on the sign of this relationship. 
In this paper we study the effect of ownership structure on performance and risk in the 
European banking industry during the 1999-2004 period. We compare MBs, GOBs, and 
POBs profitability, cost efficiency and risk, controlling for ownership concentration. To the 
extent that MBs, GOBs, and POBs share the same range of activities, regulatory framework 
and institutional objectives, any structural difference in their performance could be regarded 
as a symptom of inefficiency of the industry and may prevent the market mechanism from 
working properly. For instance, an underperforming MB is not vulnerable to a take over by 
more efficient banks; likewise, a direct market discipline mechanism2 such as the one 
envisaged by the third pillar of Basel 2 cannot be effective in the case of underperforming or 
riskier GOBs benefiting from explicit or implicit government guarantees.3 
                                                 
2
 We refer to the definition of direct market discipline proposed by Flannery (2001), as the process whereby the market 
discipline signals affect the economic and financial position of a firm. 
3
 As pointed out by Bliss and Flannery (2000), to be effective direct market discipline requires a firm’s expected cost of 
funds to be a direct function of its risk profile. This in turn requires that the firm’s management responds to market signals. 
Therefore, the existence of any ownership structure which (because, say, of its specific internal or external incentives) 
prevents the management from reacting to market signals would undermine the effectiveness of a market discipline 
architecture. Evidence of the will to level the playing field in the banking industry, regardless of the bank ownership 
structure, comes from the European Commission intervention against all 13 of the German regional banks along with some 
500-odd municipal savings banks in January 2001. The European Commission has alleged that these public sector banks 
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Our empirical analysis extends the existing literature in three main directions. First, this is 
the first study that considers both dimensions of ownership structure (i.e. ownership 
concentration and nature of the owners). Second, we compare different ownership models 
using several measures, proxying for profitability, cost efficiency and risk. Third, rather than 
focusing on a single country, we use a unique dataset based on Western European countries.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology of the empirical 
analysis. Section 3 describes the data sources and summarizes sample characteristics. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The empirical analysis aims at testing for any systematic difference in bank profitability, 
cost efficiency and risk that might be explained by differences in the ownership structure.  
2.1. Profitability and cost efficiency 
To examine whether profit and its main components vary systematically across different 
bank ownership structures, the following regression model is estimated: 
jtjtjtjtjtjt CCountryYearOSP ετλδα ++++++=  GDP       (1) 
where Pjt is the observed performance for the j-th bank at year t; OSjt is the vector of 
ownership structure variables, Yeart is a vector of time specific dummy variables; Countryj is 
a vector of country specific dummy variables; GDPjt is the national GDP annual growth rate; 
Cjt is a vector of control variables; , , , , , , the regression coefficients4; and jt the 
disturbance term. 
We use the following bank performance measures:  
                                                                                                                                                      
enjoyed unfair competitive advantages in raising funds and has required that the public banks operate on the same basis as 
the private sector banks. These unfair advantages were also highlighted and empirically estimated by Sironi (2003). 
4
  and γ are the vectors of regression coefficients for the ownership structure variables and the control variables, 
respectively. 
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PROFIT – The ratio of Operating Profit to Total Earning Assets5. PROFIT is equal to 
INCOME less COSTS. 
INCOME – The ratio of Operating Income to Total Earning Assets. 
COSTS – The ratio of Operating Costs to Total Earning Assets. 
We employ the following ownership structure characteristics (as components of the OSjt 
vector): 
GOB – A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank ultimate owner6 is either a national or 
local government7, and zero otherwise. Given the nature of their owners, government-owned 
banks are generally considered to be relatively less efficient. The expected coefficient sign of 
the GOB dummy in the PROFIT and INCOME regressions is therefore negative, while the 
expected coefficient sign in the COSTS regression is positive. 
MB – A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a mutual bank8, and zero otherwise. 
Just as government-owned banks, mutuals are generally considered as relatively less 
profitable; the expected coefficient sign on PROFIT and INCOME is therefore negative. As 
far as COSTS are concerned, the expense preference argument would suggest a positive 
sign, nonetheless, the low risk preferences of MBs would suggest a negative sign. 
POB – A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is neither a GOB nor a MB, and zero 
otherwise. 
LIST – A dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is listed in a stock market, and zero 
otherwise. We use this as a proxy for ownership dispersion and we do not have a clear 
expectation for its coefficient sign. On one side, incentive problems arising from the 
                                                 
5
 We use a before-tax performance measure for three main reasons. First, comparing after tax profit measures across 
different European countries could be lead to biased results, because tax systems differ from country to country. Second, we 
include loan loss provision as a control variable in our regressions, while an after tax profit measure would incorporate the 
loan loss provision variable. Third, this approach is consistent with the one used in other empirical studies, such as 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and (2001), and Barth, et al. (2003). 
6
 We qualify a shareholder as an Ultimate Owner of a bank when it owns more than 24.9% of the bank’s equity capital with 
no other single shareholder owning a larger share. 
7
 A state, a district (e.g. a Lander in Germany or a Canton in Switzerland), or a municipality. 
8
 We classify a bank as a mutual bank if the shareholders’ voting power is not weighted according to the number of shares 
held. The traditional rule within MBs is “one member-one vote”. Typical examples of mutual banks in Europe are the 
German Raiffeisenbanken and Volksbanken, the British Building Societies, the Italian Banche Popolari, and the Spanish 
Cajas de Ahorros. 
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separation of ownership and control become more severe when ownership is more dispersed. 
Consequently, we might expect negative coefficient signs in the PROFIT and INCOME 
regressions and a positive coefficient sign in the COSTS regression. On the other side, a 
bank whose shares are publicly traded is supposed to be positively affected by market 
discipline mechanisms. If this is the case, positive coefficient signs in the PROFIT and 
INCOME regressions and a negative coefficient sign in the COSTS regression would be 
expected. 
In order to control for country specific and time specific effects, we include the following 
variables: 
D1999, D2000, D2001, D2002, D2003, D2004 – Year dummies. Each dummy variable is 
equal to one if the performance observation refers to the correspondent year and zero 
otherwise9. 
Country dummies10. Each dummy variable is equal to one if the bank nationality is that of 
the corresponding country and zero otherwise11.  
Moreover, in order to control for macroeconomic conditions, we include the following 
variable: 
GDP – The national GDP growth rate12. 
Finally, the following control variables (as components of the Cjt vector) are employed: 
SIZE – The log of Total Assets13. As pointed out by McAllister and McManus (1993), 
larger banks have better risk diversification opportunities and thus lower cost of funding than 
smaller ones. As a result, larger banks should exhibit relatively higher levels of Net Interest 
                                                 
9
 The D1999 dummy variable has been dropped to avoid collinearity in the data. 
10
 Country dummy variables are the following (the corresponding countries are reported in parenthesis): D_AU (Austria), 
D_BE (Belgium), D_CH (Switzerland), D_DE (Germany), D_ES (Spain), D_FI (Finland), D_FR (France), D_GR (Greece), 
D_EI (Ireland), D_IT (Italy), D_LU (Luxembourg), D_ NL (The Netherlands), D_PT (Portugal), DE_SE (Sweden), D_UK 
(United Kingdom). 
11
 The D_UK dummy variable has been dropped to avoid collinearity in the data. 
12
 The GDP variable should account for the impact of the economic cycle on the bank performances, while the country 
dummy variables should capture any difference in the institutional framework, the degree of competition, the accounting 
standards, etc., among the European countries. It is worth mentioning that our results are qualitatively unchanged when we 
control for bond and stock market conditions, by including the following two variables: (i) the change (over the previous 
year) of the 10 year government bond yield and (ii) the return of the stock market index. Results, not reported, do not 
change in any material way. 
13
 In order to have comparable values, we convert the Total Assets of the banks in the sample into euro. 
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Income and, hence, of INCOME. As far as financial scale economies are concerned, we 
expect a positive coefficient for INCOME, even though the inherent complexity of larger 
banks might mitigate this effect. An expected positive sign for the coefficient of this variable 
in the INCOME regression is also supported by the “too-big-to-fail” argument. Larger banks 
would benefit from an implicit guarantee that, other things equal, decreases their cost of 
funding and allows them to invest in riskier assets. Referring to COSTS, the existence of 
non-financial scale economies would result in a negative sign. Previous empirical evidence 
on this issue produced ambiguous results14. 
LOANS – The ratio of Loans to Total Earning Assets. Loans might be more profitable 
than other types of assets, such as securities; hence, we expect a positive coefficient sign for 
this variable in the INCOME regression. Nonetheless, loans might also be more costly to 
produce than other types of assets. A positive coefficient sign in the COSTS regression 
would result in this case. As a result, the net impact of LOANS on PROFIT is uncertain. 
LIQUID – The ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets. While liquid assets reduce the bank 
liquidity risk, they typically generate a relatively lower return and are less costly to handle. 
Therefore, we expect a negative coefficient sign both in the INCOME and COSTS 
regressions. Again, the net impact of LIQUID on PROFIT is uncertain. 
DEPOSITS – The ratio of Retail Deposits to Total Funding. On average, retail deposits 
carry a lower interest cost, thus increasing bank profitability. This is why we expect a 
positive coefficient sign for this variable in the INCOME regression. Nonetheless, retail 
deposits are costly in terms of the required branching network, thus a positive coefficient 
sign is expected for this variable in the COSTS regression. As a result, the net impact of 
DEPOSITS on PROFIT is uncertain. 
                                                 
14
 For instance, Berger, et al. (1987), McAllister and McManus (1993), and Berger and Humphrey (1997) find that 
economies of scale are negligible, and Humphrey (1990) finds that the average cost curve is a relatively flat U-shape, while 
Hughes and Mester (1998), and Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) find positive economies of scale for a broader range of size 
classes for American banks and French and Italian banks respectively, including banks with total assets above US$ 3 
billion. However, Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) do not find significant scale economies for banks above the size of US$ 
100 million in Germany and Spain. 
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CAPITAL – The ratio of Book Value of Equity to Total Assets. Equity includes preferred 
shares and common equity. Any prediction on the sign of the coefficient of this variable on 
INCOME, COSTS, and PROFIT is far from easy. On one side, better capitalized banks may 
reflect higher management quality, thereby generating a positive and a negative coefficient 
sign in the INCOME and COSTS regression respectively, resulting in an expected positive 
impact on the PROFIT variable. Moreover, as pointed out by Berger (1995), well capitalized 
firms face lower expected bankruptcy costs, which in turn reduce their cost of funding and 
increase their INCOME. A third interpretation relies on the effects of the Basel Accord, 
requiring banks to hold a minimum level of capital as a percentage of risk-weighted assets. 
Higher levels of CAPITAL may therefore denote banks with riskier assets (Iannotta, 2006). 
According to this interpretation, a positive coefficient would be expected for this variable in 
the INCOME regression. 
LOANLOSS – The ratio of Loan Loss Provision to Total Loans. We use this variable to 
proxy for asset quality. Riskier loans should produce higher interest income, with a positive 
impact on INCOME. On the other hand, a poorer asset quality should increase the bank cost 
of funding, thus reducing INCOME. Moreover, higher loan quality typically implies more 
resources on credit underwriting and loan monitoring, thus increasing COSTS (Mester, 
1996). As a result, the net impact of LOANLOSS on PROFIT is unpredictable. 
2.2. Bank risk  
While different ownership structures may affect the profitability and cost efficiency of 
banks, these differences may in turn arise from different risk taking behaviors. We therefore 
extend our empirical analysis by investigating whether different ownership structures do 
affect banks’ asset quality and risk. We conduct this analysis in two alternative ways. Using 
the entire sample, we estimate the following regression model: 
jtjtjtjtjtjt CCountryYearOSLOANLOSS ετλδα +′+++++=  GDP      (2.1) 
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where LOANLOSSjt is the observed value for the variables LOANLOSS for the j-th bank 
at year t and jtC ′  is a vector of control variables, which differs from jtC  because the 
LOANLOSS variable is dropped. Moreover, using the restricted sample of the listed banks 
and to the extent that stock market data are available, we estimate the following regression 
model: 
jtjtjtjtjtjt CCountryYearSO ετλδαρ +++++′+= ' GDP       (2.2) 
where jtρ  is the observed value for the variables LN() and LN(Z) for the j-th bank at 
year t and jtSO ′  is the vector of ownership structure variables. Vector jtSO ′  differs from 
jtOS , as it does not include the LIST variable, which is substituted by F_SHARE. 
LN() – The log of Asset Return Volatility. We proxy banks’ risk by using a measure of 
returns on assets volatility. Following Boyd and Graham (1988) and De Nicolò (2001), we 
use a measure of total shareholders’ profits for the j-th bank at year t: 
( )jtjtjtjtjt DPPN +−= −1pi  
where jtN  is the number of shares outstanding, jtP  is the price of shares at time t, and 
jtD  is the amount of dividends paid out during t. Therefore, bank j return on assets is 
measured by )(M
jt
jt
jt A
R
pi
= , where )(MjtA  is the market value of assets, proxied by the sum of 
the market value of equity plus the accounting value of liabilities, i.e. )()()( Bjt
M
jt
M
jt LEA +≡ . 
Finally, Return Volatility, , is measured by the annualized standard deviation of banks’ 
monthly return on assets. 
LN(Z) – The log of Insolvency Risk. According to Boyd and Graham (1988) and De 
Nicolò (2001), Insolvency Risk, Z, for bank’ j at time t is measured by: 
jt
jt
jt
jt
jt
A
E
Z
σ
µ
ˆ
ˆ








+
=  
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where jtµˆ  and jtσˆ  are sample estimates (based on the monthly values of jtR ) of the mean 
and standard deviation of bank’s i returns on assets at time t, and 
jt
jt
A
E
 is the t-th time average 
of the market capital-to-asset ratio. In such a case, a higher level of LN(Z) corresponds to a 
lower upper bound of insolvency, i.e. a lower probability of default. 
F_SHARE – The ownership percentage held by the largest shareholder. 
As far as our ex ante expectations of the impact of the different ownership models on risk 
are concerned, the following arguments can be put forward. GOBs might be set up by 
benevolent social planners to pursue industrial policies directed at remedying market 
failures. According to this view, GOBs make loans that the private sector would not grant15. 
If this is the case, we would expect a positive coefficient sign of the GOB dummy in the 
LOANLOSS and LN() regressions and, all else being equal, a negative coefficient sign in 
the LN(Z) regression.  
According to Rasmusen (1988), since managers of MBs cannot own the net assets of their 
organizations, they cannot fully benefit from an increased variability of returns. Thus MBs 
should be involved in less risky activities than POBs. A negative coefficient sign in the 
LOANLOSS and LN() regressions would result in this case for MB. All else being equal, 
we expect a positive coefficient sign in the LN(Z) regression. 
According to the agency theory, managers of firms with dispersed ownership may take 
less risk than is optimal for shareholders. Moreover, risk taking in dispersed ownership 
banks may be constrained by market discipline. This is why we expect a negative coefficient 
sign for LIST and a positive coefficient sign for F_SHARE in the LOANLOSS and LN() 
regressions, and the opposite signs in the LN(Z) regression.  
3. DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
                                                 
15
 According to this argument, private sector banks would “cherry-pick” the best loans and the GOBs would intervene to 
expand their country’s financial system or to facilitate desirable loans that are not profitable enough for the private sector to 
undertake (Sapienza (2004) refers to this as the “social view”). 
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We use income statement, balance sheet, and ownership information data from 1999 to 
2004 (inclusive) of European banks from the Fitch IBCA/Bureau van Dijk’s BankScope 
database. We focus on the largest banks in 15 European countries16, defined as banks that 
have total assets of at least (the equivalent of) € 10 billions in (at least) one of 1999-2004 
fiscal year end. We use data from consolidated accounts if available, and from 
unconsolidated accounts otherwise. In order to avoid double-counting, we retain only the 
top-tier multitiered bank holding companies. 
We start with the complete sample of banks in BankScope, resulting in a total number of 
bank-year observations of 1,674 (on average 281 banks per year17). However, we end up 
with a smaller sample, as we apply some selection criteria. First, we apply a number of 
outlier rules to the main variables (roughly corresponding to the 1st and 99th percentiles of 
the distributions of the respective variables). We also delete banks that entered, exited, or 
were taken over, which would create the possibility of various kinds of sample selection 
effects. As a consequence, banks with fewer than the maximum number of time observations 
are excluded, creating a balanced panel. It is worth mentioning, however, that our results are 
qualitatively unchanged when we include all banks in the database. Our final data set 
consists of 181 banks from 15 countries for a total of 1,086 bank-year observations for which 
we have both ownership and accounting data. For listed banks only, we define a smaller data 
set. It consists of 386 bank-year observations for which we have ownership, accounting data, 
and stock price series. The latter are taken from Datastream. Due to the data shortage, this 
second data set is an unbalanced panel. Table 1 reports the number of banks and the number 
of bank-year observations from each country and for each type of ownership structure for 
both the entire sample and the listed banks subsample. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
                                                 
16
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom. 
17
 The initial sample consists of 338 different banks. 
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4.1. Does bank profitability vary according to ownership structure? 
Descriptive and univariate analysis 
Table 2 reports sample descriptive statistics for both profit (and its components) and the 
control variables. Statistics are provided for the entire sample and are also broken up into 
year and countries subsamples, in order to detect any time or country specific trend.  
In Table 3 (panels 1-4) we perform t-tests for equality of MBs vs POBs, GOBs vs POBs, 
MBs vs GOBs, and listed vs unlisted banks variable means. In order to conduct this analysis 
we use four different samples. We use three different subsamples for the MBs vs POBs 
(Panel 1), GOBs vs POBs (Panel 2), MBs vs GOBs (Panel 3) analysis, by excluding, 
respectively, GOBs, MBs and POBs. We also use our entire sample (Panel 4) as we are 
interested in documenting any difference between dispersed and concentrated ownership 
banks, regardless of the nature of their ownership (i.e. government vs private or mutual vs 
stock).  
By comparing MBs vs POBs (Panel 1), we document that POBs are more profitable than 
MBs in terms of PROFIT. This seems to be explained by a higher INCOME, while the 
difference in COSTS is not statistically significant. Other significant differences between 
MBs and POBs refer to SIZE (expressed as the amount of Total Assets), CAPITAL, 
DEPOSITS and LOANLOSS: MBs are relatively smaller, better capitalized, funded with a 
higher percentage of retail deposits18 and have better loan quality than POBs. 
As far as the comparison between GOBs and POBs is concerned (Panel 2), we find that 
POBs’ PROFIT is more than twice that of GOBs (1.24% and 0.52%, respectively) and this 
difference is statistically significant. By breaking down the PROFIT variable into its two 
components, we document two interesting results: (i) the INCOME of POBs is 3.14%, 
compared to 1.36% of GOBs, and (ii) COSTS are remarkably higher for POBs than for 
GOBs (1.90% and 0.84% respectively). Thus, even though GOBs are more cost efficient, 
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 This could be explained by the limited access of mutual banks to the bond market. 
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POBs are significantly more profitable. Apart from this, GOBs seem to be very different 
from POBs: GOBs are smaller and less capitalized than POBs. They also have a different 
asset mix, as GOBs have a lower percentage of loans (corresponding to a higher percentage 
of liquidity) and deposits. There is no significant difference in terms of loan loss provisions. 
By comparing GOBs vs MBs (Panel 3), we see that MBs are more profitable than GOBs. 
Similarly to the POBs vs GOBs case, MBs have higher INCOME and COSTS. In addition to 
this, MBs tend to be significantly smaller and better capitalized, and have a higher 
percentage of loans (offset by a lower percentage of liquidity) and deposits than GOBs. 
Finally, MBs have a lower ratio of loan loss provision to total loans. 
As far as the comparison between listed and unlisted banks is concerned (Panel 4), we 
find that the former are more profitable (the average PROFIT of the listed banks is 1.27% 
while non listed banks exhibit a 0.95%). Again, by breaking down the PROFIT into its two 
components, we find that listed banks exhibit both higher INCOME (3.31% compared to 
1.36% of unlisted banks) and higher COSTS (2.03% against 1.52%). Thus, unlisted banks 
prove to be more cost efficient, but significantly less profitable (in terms of both PROFIT 
and INCOME) than listed banks. Other significant differences between listed and unlisted 
banks refer to SIZE, CAPITAL, LOANS, DEPOSITS and LOANLOSS: listed banks are 
larger, better capitalized, funded with a higher percentage of retail deposits and have higher 
loans loss provisions than unlisted banks. 
To sum up, based on this univariate evidence, we can conclude that POBs are more 
profitable than GOBs and MBs. However, while POBs and MBs do not seem to be very 
different in terms of their asset mix, GOBs look quite peculiar, since they are less 
capitalized, have lower retail deposits, lower loans and higher liquidity. The distinctiveness 
of GOBs may be supported by the following argument: so far European GOBs have enjoyed 
explicit and implicit government guarantees, a clear example being represented by the 
German Landesbanken. As a consequence, GOBs could afford to operate with a lower 
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capitalization and enjoyed a comparative cost advantage in funding their investments by 
tapping the wholesale capital market, with large size bond issues. This lower cost of funding 
in turn led to lower retail deposits and higher liquidity. Basically, a different type of financial 
intermediation model appear to exist for GOBs, with more capital market funding, lower 
retail deposits, higher short term liquid investments and lower loans. This in turn led to 
lower costs of credit underwriting, loan monitoring and retail deposits processing (lower 
COSTS).  
Finally, listed banks differ from unlisted banks in terms of size, asset mix, asset quality 
and operating performance: indeed, listed banks appear to be more profitable but less cost 
efficient. 
Multivariate regression analysis 
Columns 1-6 of Table 4 report the OLS regression estimate of Equation (1) with bank 
PROFIT (columns 1 and 2) and its components, INCOME (columns 3 and 4) and COSTS 
(columns 5 and 6) as dependent variables. For each of these measures we run two OLS 
regressions. The first ones (columns 1, 3, and 5) do not take into account any difference in 
the ownership structures of the banks. In the others (columns 2, 4, and 6), the set of 
explanatory variables includes MB, GOB, and LIST. Here, the dummy variable for POB is 
excluded, so that the estimated coefficients of MB and GOB measure the effect of each 
ownership structure on performances relative to POBs. Hence, the intercepts pick up the 
effect of privately-owned unlisted banks. Finally, we perform a Wald test for the equality of 
the coefficients of MB and GOB. It is important to note that the inclusion of ownership 
structure variables does not affect the coefficient signs nor the significance of the bank 
characteristics and control variables. 
Column 2 reports the results for regressions of PROFIT. Again, the dummy variable for 
POB is excluded. MB and GOB are both statistically significant (respectively at the 1% and 
5% level) and have a negative coefficient, indicating that MBs and GOBs are less profitable 
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than POBs after controlling for other bank characteristics. The LIST dummy variable is not 
significant. The Wald test indicates that on average, GOBs and MBs do not have a 
significantly different PROFIT. 
Columns 4 and 6 report the results for regressions of INCOME and COSTS, respectively. 
MB and GOB both have strongly significant negative coefficients, while the LIST dummy 
variable has a significant (respectively at the 10% and 5% level) positive coefficient in both 
regressions. These findings indicate that, on average, MBs and GOBs have both lower 
INCOME and COSTS. In contrast, banks with dispersed ownership have both higher 
INCOME and COSTS.  
All the variables controlling for the bank characteristics have statistically significant 
coefficients in both the INCOME and COSTS regression analysis. As far as PROFIT is 
concerned, SIZE, LOANS, CAPITAL, and LOANLOSS all exhibit significantly positive 
coefficients, while both LIQUID and DEPOSITS are not significant. 
Summing up, our findings indicate that private banks are more profitable than both 
mutual and public sector banks. However, this better profit performance stems from higher 
net returns on their earning assets rather than from a superior cost efficiency. In fact, and 
quite surprisingly, public and mutual banks’ COSTS are relatively lower. Also, public sector 
banks are on average less profitable than other banks, have a larger share of their funding 
coming from the wholesale interbank and capital markets, a higher liquidity and lower 
investments in loans. Conversely, mutual banks appear much more similar to private banks. 
They enjoy more favorable customer relationships, which in turn explain their lower 
operating costs. Their lower profitability is most likely the consequence of a lower average 
size and different kind of asset mix, as these banks are typically involved in more traditional 
financial intermediation activities than large private banks. 
4.2. Does risk taking vary according to ownership structure? 
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As far as risk is concerned, we conduct two different analysis. First, we use LOANLOSS 
as a proxy for both asset quality and risk. We obtain estimates of Equation (2.1) by running 
OLS regressions on the entire sample of banks and on the smaller sample of listed banks. For 
the latter, we also estimate Equation (2.2).  
Univariate analysis 
Tests reported in Table 3 indicate that MBs tend to have lower LOANLOSS than both 
POBs and GOBs (Panels 1 and 3), while no significant difference in asset quality emerges 
between POBs and GOBs (Panel 2). We also find that listed banks tend to have relatively 
higher LOANLOSS (Panel 4). However, when the same tests are performed over the sub-
sample of listed banks (Panels 5-7), we do not find any significant difference between POBs, 
MBs and GOBs in terms of both LOANLOSS and the Insolvency Risk Measure, LN(Z). On 
the contrary, significant differences emerge in terms of the standard deviation of Returns on 
Assets (): POBs appear to be riskier than both MBs and GOBs, while no significant 
difference emerges between MBs and GOBs. It is important to highlight that while the 
Returns on Assets volatility measure is a proxy of a bank’s asset risk, LN(Z) represents a 
proxy of a bank’s default probability which also reflects a bank’s capitalization. The above 
mentioned results therefore indicate that POBs tend to have a higher asset risk but not 
necessarily a higher default probability. 
Regression analysis 
Columns 7-9 of Table 4 report regressions of LOANLOSS. The first regression (column 
7) does not take into account any difference in the ownership structure s of the banks. In the 
other two regressions (columns 8 and 9), the ownership structure variables are included. 
Consistently with our expectations, we find that MB and GOB have a significant negative 
and positive coefficient respectively (column 8), denoting that MBs and GOBs have better 
and worse asset quality respectively, compared to POBs. The statistically significant 
difference in loan quality between MBs and GOBs is proved by the significance of the Wald 
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test for the equality of MB and GOB coefficients. The significant positive sign of the LIST 
variable denotes that on average listed banks have lower quality loans than unlisted banks. 
Replacing the LIST variable with the F_SHARE variable (column 9) all the results hold with 
the exception of the MB variable which loses significance19.  
For the sub-sample of listed banks we use two alternative risk measures, LN() and 
LN(Z)20. The results, reported in columns 10 and 11 of Table 4, are only partly consistent 
with the ones obtained for the entire sample21. That is, MBs tend to be less risky than POBs, 
while the not significant coefficient of GOB variable and the Wald test show that GOBs are 
not significantly riskier than POBs nor than MBs as in the previous result (column 10). 
Looking at the insolvency risk measure (column11), only GOB is significant among the 
ownership structure variables, indicating a higher insolvency risk for government-owned 
banks (negative coefficient signs). Once again, the difference in the results concerning the 
two alternative risk variables - LN() and LN(Z) – can be attributed to the fact that a 
different asset risk can be compensated by a different level of capitalization. 
As far as the ownership concentration, consistently with regression 9, higher 
concentration, measured by F_SHARE variable, produces lower risk, in terms of both LN() 
and LN(Z).  
The use of different risk proxies and different samples does not lead to unique and 
unambiguous results. However, three main results emerge from our multivariate regressions. 
First, public sector banks have poorer loan quality and higher insolvency risk than other 
types of banks. Second, mutual banks have better loan quality and lower asset risk than both 
                                                 
19
 Substituting the LIST variable with the F_SHARE causes a drop in the number of observations, due to the limited 
availability of shareholder data. 
20
 Since the LN(Z) is determined by the market value capital ratio while CAPITAL is a book value measure, we keep 
CAPITAL as a control variable. Nonetheless, no significant difference emerges in the results when excluding CAPITAL 
from the set of control variables.  
21
 We run the same kind of regressions reported in columns 1-8 (LIST is replaced with F_SHARE for these regressions) and 
in column 9 of Table 4 for the sub-sample of listed banks (not reported). The main results on ownership structure variable 
hold. 
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private and public sector banks. Finally, a higher ownership concentration is generally 
associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk and lower insolvency risk.  
Summing up, our results concerning risk indicate that public sector banks have poorer 
loan quality and higher insolvency risk than other types of banks. This result is consistent 
with the existence of conjectural or explicit government guarantees, which in turn allow 
these banks to avoid the indirect costs – in terms of capital markets effects - of their poorer 
asset quality and less profitable intermediation activity. On the other side, mutual banks have 
better loan quality and lower asset risk than both private and public sector banks. This is 
mostly the consequence of the fact that these banks enjoy more favorable customer 
relationships, which in turn also explain their lower operating costs 
4.3. Robustness checks 
We test the robustness of our empirical results using different types of analysis.  
First, since there is some evidence (Berger et al. 2000; Roland, 1997) that bank profits do 
persist over time, and (Goddard et al., 2004) vary by ownership type we include a (one year) 
lagged performance measure as explanatory variable in regression model (1). Results, not 
reported, are similar to those obtained with the LIST dummy variable. Indeed, lagged 
performance measures have a significant positive coefficient in PROFIT, INCOME, and 
COSTS regressions. 
Second, Goddard et al. (2004) find that there is little evidence of systematic variation in 
profitability by ownership type in European countries other than Germany. Therefore, in 
order to check whether our results are driven by German banks (which account for a great 
number of observations) we run regressions of Table 4 excluding German bank observations. 
Results, not reported, confirm our main findings. 
Further, we perform the same multivariate regressions on the unbalanced sample of 1,684 
bank-year observations. This sample differs from our base one, since it includes all the bank-
year observations which meet the original sample criteria without deleting any outlier or 
 20 
bank with less than 6 year observations. Results, not reported to save space, are similar to 
those obtained with our base sample.  
We also use the alternative measure of ownership dispersion (for those banks for which 
data are available), defined as the ownership share held by the first shareholder 
(F_SHARE)22, in the regression specifications reported in columns 2, 4, and 6 of Table 4. 
Results, not reported, are similar to those obtained with the LIST dummy variable23.  
In addition, we use different configurations for the GOB variable (defining a bank as 
GOB if a public authority holds at least 50%, 75% and 100% of its capital) without finding 
any relevant difference in our results. Moreover, results (not reported) do not change by 
substituting the GOB dummy variable with a continuous variable defined as the ownership 
percentage held by a public authority. 
Finally, since the GOB variable denotes the presence of a shareholder holding at least 
25% of the bank’s equity capital, it may capture some ownership concentration effect. 
Although the inclusion of the LIST variable in the regressions may be reassuring, we add the 
F_SHARE variable in the regression specifications reported in Table 4, without observing 
any change in both the significance and sign of the GOB variable. These results are not 
reported to save space. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper investigates whether any significant difference exists in the performance and 
risk of European banks with different ownership structure. After controlling for size, output 
mix, asset quality, country and year effects, and specific macroeconomic growth 
differentials, we test for systematic differences in bank performances between mutual banks, 
public sector banks and private banks, and banks with different ownership concentration.  
                                                 
22
 Shareholder information in the BankScope database are not sufficiently complete to compute any other effective and 
reliable measure of ownership dispersion/concentration. 
23
 Obviously, since LIST should proxy for banks with dispersed ownership, while F_SHARE is supposed to be positively 
related to ownership concentration, the signs of F_SHARE coefficients are the opposite of the LIST ones.  
 21 
Our results confirm that significant differences in performance and risk do exist, although 
their signs are not always consistent with expectations. More specifically, private banks 
appear to be more profitable than both mutual and public sector banks. However, this better 
profit performance stems from higher net returns on their earning assets rather than from a 
superior cost efficiency. In fact, and quite surprisingly, public and mutual banks’ COSTS are 
relatively lower. On the risk side, public sector banks have poorer loan quality and higher 
insolvency risk than other types of banks, while mutual banks have better loan quality and 
lower asset risk than both private and public sector banks.  
Summing up, our findings indicate that public sector banks are on average less profitable 
and riskier than other banks. Moreover, their banking activity seems to be very peculiar, with 
a larger share of their funding coming from the wholesale interbank and capital markets, a 
higher liquidity and lower investments in loans. This different kind of financial 
intermediation model appears consistent with the existence of conjectural or explicit 
government guarantees, which in turn allow these banks to avoid the indirect costs – in terms 
of capital markets effects - of their poorer asset quality and less profitable intermediation 
activity. 
Conversely, mutual banks appear much more similar to private banks. They enjoy more 
favorable customer relationships, which in turn explain both their higher loan quality and 
their lower operating costs. Their lower profitability is most likely the consequence of a 
lower average size and different kind of asset mix, as these banks are typically involved in 
more traditional financial intermediation activities than large private banks. However, as 
these types of financial institutions become increasingly involved in the same range of 
activities of any private sector bank and their activities are not confined to the ones related to 
the institutional objectives linked to the community they were originally set up to serve, their 
peculiar ownership structure based on the “one member one vote” rule which prevents them 
 22 
from being vulnerable to takeovers from more efficient banks becomes more and more 
questionable. 
These results have some relevant policy implications. If European banking regulators and 
policy makers in general really aim at leveling the playing field, safeguarding banks’ asset 
quality, improving the banking industry efficiency and strengthening market discipline, then 
they should eliminate any form of explicit guarantee protecting public banks, clearly inform 
capital market investors that no too-big-to-fail or other form of bailout policy will ever be 
applied in the future for these types of banks, and remove the obstacle to the contestability of 
mutual banks, which is mostly related to the “one head one vote” rule.    
Finally, our results concerning the ownership concentration are quite puzzling and 
deserve further research. While we find that the profitability of banks with more dispersed 
owners is not significantly different from the one of more concentrated banks, we also find 
that a higher ownership concentration is associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk 
and lower insolvency risk. To the extent that dispersed ownership banks are found to incur 
higher operating costs per euro of earning assets than concentrated ownership banks, this 
finding is consistent with the agency theory prediction: however, this same theoretical 
framework does not help to explain the lower loan quality and higher asset risk of banks with 
a less concentrated ownership structure. 
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Table 1 – Number of Banks and Observations 
 Entire Sample Listed Banks Subsample 
  Banks Obs. MB POB GOB LIST Banks Obs. MB POB GOB 
  Obs. Obs. Obs. Obs. Obs. Obs. Obs. 
Banks in the sample 181 1,086 336 626 124 500 74 386 40 327 19 
1999 181 181 56 105 20 80 55 55 5 47 3 
2000 181 181 56 105 20 92 60 60 6 51 3 
2001 181 181 56 105 20 87 64 64 5 57 2 
2002 181 181 56 104 21 84 66 66 6 57 3 
2003 181 181 56 103 22 84 70 70 9 57 4 
2004 181 181 56 104 21 73 71 71 9 58 4 
AT 8 48 6 36 6 22 5 23 4 19 0 
BE 5 30 6 24 0 21 3 17 0 17 0 
CH 6 36 6 18 12 24 5 28 0 11 17 
DE 32 192 28 77 87 56 6 31 0 30 1 
ES 26 156 108 48 0 44 6 32 0 32 0 
FI 3 18 12 6 0 7 1 6 6 0 0 
FR 21 126 73 53 0 34 5 27 15 12 0 
GR 5 30 0 29 1 30 5 27 0 26 1 
IE 5 30 6 24 0 24 4 23 0 23 0 
IT 19 114 36 78 0 92 16 75 14 61 0 
LU 4 24 6 12 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 
NL 5 30 6 24 0 14 2 12 0 12 0 
PT 6 36 0 30 6 23 3 18 0 18 0 
SE 9 54 1 47 6 24 4 22 1 21 0 
UK 27 162 42 120 0 82 9 45 0 45 0 
 
 
Table 2 – Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Reported are mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of profit (and its components) and accounting variables. 
      PROFIT INCOME COSTS 
Total Assets 
(ml EUR) LOANS LIQUID DEPOSIT CAPITAL LOANLOSS 
  N. of Obs. N. of Banks Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
  
  
(St. Dev.) (St. Dev.) (St. Dev.) (St. Dev.) (St. Dev.) (St. Dev.) (St. Dev.) (St. Dev.) (St. Dev.) 
Entire sample 1,086 181 1.10% 2.86% 1.76% 109.900 61,77% 24,36% 79,27% 5,01% 0,45% 
    (0.89%) (1.68%) (1.06%) (164.913) (20,35%) (15,11%) (21,68%) (2,35%) (0,45%) 
1999 181 181 1.24% 3.10% 1.86% 86.638 60,06% 26,98% 79,91% 5,06% 0,43% 
    (1.47%) (2.22%) (1.15%) (125.127) (19,89%) (15,58%) (22,42%) (2,66%) (0,50%) 
2000 181 181 1.18% 2.99% 1.81% 102.449) 61,22% 24,70% 79,60% 5,04% 0,39% 
    (0.97%) (1.81%) (1.11%) (151.568) (19,72%) (14,77%) (21,86%) (2,47%) (0,33%) 
2001 181 181 1.06% 2.86% 1.79% 112.608 61,74% 24,17% 79,89% 4,96% 0,47% 
    (0.68%) (1.53%) (1.04%) (168.645) (19,74%) (14,56%) (21,52%) (2,26%) (0,47%) 
2002 181 181 1.00% 2.77% 1.77% 111.335 62,43% 23,68% 79,56% 4,90% 0,55% 
    (0.64%) (1.48%) (1.02%) (158.927) (20,71%) (15,28%) (21,67%) (2,17%) (0,54%) 
2003 181 181 1.07% 2.78% 1.71% 116.723 62,48% 23,57% 78,48% 5,07% 0,49% 
    (0.66%) (1.47%) (1.03%) (174.944) (20,80%) (14,96%) (21,49%) (2,35%) (0,42%) 
2004 181 181 1.04% 2.65% 1.61% 129.648 62,71% 23,06% 78,16% 5,02% 0,39% 
    (0.61%) (1.41%) (0.99%) (199.877) (21,31%) (15,35%) (21,36%) (2,22%) (0,40%) 
AT 48 8 0.78% 2.18% 1.40% 41.413 51,46% 31,85% 64,97% 3,82% 0,60% 
    (0.43%) (1.02%) (0.65%) (51.757) (20,28%) (24,27%) (27,68%) (1,39%) (0,47%) 
BE 30 5 0.84% 2.84% 1.99% 283.873 43,93% 26,82% 85,54% 3,96% 0,28% 
    (0.22%) (1.07%) (0.92%) (120.466) (4,96%) (12,29%) (12,04%) (0,90%) (0,20%) 
CH 36 6 0.82% 2.46% 1.65% 159.900 75,43% 17,65% 82,00% 5,00% 0,39% 
    (0.24%) (0.65%) (0.62%) (318.800 (23,35%) (22,88%) (10,38%) (1,68%) (1,00%) 
DE 192 32 0.43% 1.19% 0.77% 124.800 48,93% 34,37% 61,37% 2,68% 0,45% 
    (0.26%) (0.75%) (0.63%) (149.723) (17,96%) (13,99%) (28,11%) (1,16%) (0,49%) 
ES 156 26 1.61% 3.70% 2.09% 46.586 69,71% 22,83% 89,43% 7,21% 0,45% 
    (0.49%) (0.94%) (0.59%) (86.410) (10,92%) (8,81%) (8,91%) (2,41%) (0,26%) 
FI 18 3 1.47% 3.23% 1.76% 64.089 66,54% 21,08% 90,30% 6,87% 0,05% 
    (0.54%) (1.14%) (0.70%) (69.178) (13,51%) (12,06%) (4,88%) (2,44%) (0,13%) 
FR 126 21 0.85% 2.74% 1.88% 193.752 44,17% 31,33% 88,39% 3,88% 0,46% 
    (0.57%) (1.61%) (1.09%) (207.653) (19,92%) (14,97%) (13,66%) (1,56%) (0,28%) 
GR 30 5 2.19% 5.16% 2.97% 26.478 55,96% 35,44% 96,33% 8,02% 0,92% 
    (1.07%) (1.36%) (0.58%) (14.047) (13,47%) (11,44%) (6,00%) (2,91%) (0,22%) 
IE 30 5 2.09% 3.92% 1.84% 46.261 69,39% 18,76% 90,77% 5,56% 0,21% 
    (3.12%) (3.66%) (0.99%) (34.545) (7,87%) (5,86%) (9,53%) (0,90%) (0,19%) 
IT 114 19 1.31% 4.03% 2.72% 69.544 70,34% 22,68% 74,15% 3,66% 0,77% 
    (0.64%) (1.05%) (0.74%) (81.761) (8,70%) (7,15%) (11,03%) (1,05%) (0,46%) 
LU 24 4 0.69% 1.59% 0.90% 23.803 21,90% 44,76% 84,62% 6,77% 0,18% 
    (0.37%) (0.61%) (0.29%) (12.202) (6,17%) (6,74%) (12,30%) (2,36%) (0,36%) 
NL 30 5 0.83% 3.29% 2.46% 230.266 64,39% 8,83% 63,29% 5,38% 0,25% 
    (0.61%) (1.50%) (1.71%) (282.579) (12,76%) (2,66%) (24,51%) (1,48%) (0,18%) 
PT 36 6 1.35% 3.54% 2.19% 37.289 75,29% 15,93% 84,11% 5,52% 0,62% 
    (0.27%) (0.49%) (0.40%) (21.299) (10,45%) (6,09%) (7,70%) (0,92%) (0,25%) 
SE 54 9 0.99% 1.73% 0.74% 78.367 86,41% 11,14% 52,96% 4,23% 0,05% 
    (0.27%) (0.85%) (0.77%) (68.755) (13,30%) (10,71%) (25,25%) (0,92%) (0,09%) 
UK 162 27 1.33% 3.26% 1.93% 142.793 73,68% 14,02% 93,02% 5,24% 0,41% 
      (0.93%) (1.79%) (1.07%) (204.763) (13,36%) (10,07%) (8,11%) (1,41%) (0,48%) 
 
Table 3 – Bivariate Comparison of Bank Performances, Control Variables and Risk Measures 
 
 Entire sample Listed Banks Subsample 
 Panel 1 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 Panel 5 Panel 6 Panel 7 
 (GOBs excluded) (MBs excluded) (POBs excluded) (All banks) (GOBs excluded) (MBs excluded) (POBs excluded) 
 MBs POBs GOBs POBs MBs GOBs LIST NON-LIST MBs POBs GOBs POBs MBs GOBs 
 [t statistic] [t statistic] [t statistic] [t statistic] [t statistic] [t statistic] [t statistic] 
PROFIT 1.05% 1.24% 0.52% 1.24% 1.05% 0.52% 1.28 0.95% 0.84% 1.29% 0.64% 1.29% 0.84% 0.64% 
 
[-3.550]*** [-14.270]*** [12.748]*** [6.089]*** [-6.072]*** [-4.184]*** [1.913]** 
INCOME 2.89% 3.14% 1.36% 3.14% 2.89% 1.36% 3.31% 2.47% 2.78% 3.45% 2.28% 3.45% 2.78% 2.28% 
 
[-2.362]** [-17.635]*** [15.316]*** [8.452]*** [-2.919]*** [-9.347]*** [2.527]** 
COSTS 1.84% 1.90% 0.84% 1.90% 1.84% 0.84% 2.03% 1.52% 1.93% 3.45% 1.64% 3.45% 1.93% 1.64% 
 
[-0.855] [-15.351]*** [13.884]*** [8.364]*** [-1.353] [-5.410]*** [1.805]** 
Total Assets 70,621 132,441 102,540 131,441 70,621 102,540 156,927 69,775 109,819 182,539 23,314 182,539 109,819 23,314 
 
[-6.257]*** [-2.447]** [-2.701]*** [8.550]*** [-2.294]** [-11.144]** [2.917]*** 
CAPITAL 5.82% 4.88% 3.48% 4.88% 5.82% 3.48% 5.24% 4.81% 5.18% 5.18% 5.71% 5.18% 5.18% 5.71% 
 
[5.673]*** [-8.470]*** [11.681]*** [3.074]*** [-0.013] [1.126] [-1.056] 
LOANS 62.77% 64.07% 47.45% 64.07% 62.77% 47.45% 62.55% 61.11% 53.30% 63.47% 78.86% 63.47% 53.30% 78.86% 
 
[-1.005] [-7.372]*** [7.198]*** [1.207] [-3.374]*** [4.776]*** [-5.841]*** 
LIQUID 23.60% 22.72% 34.71% 22.72% 23.60% 34.71% 23.15% 25.39% 30.11% 22.54% 12.12% 22.54% 30.11% 12.12% 
 
[0.910] [7.187]*** [-6.441]*** [-2.505]** [4.118]*** [-4.003]*** [6.703]*** 
DEPOSITS 88.41% 76.68% 67.59% 76.68% 88.41% 67.59% 81.25% 77.58% 79.99% 79.34% 75.29% 79.34% 79.99% 75.29% 
 
[9.608]*** [-4.057]*** [9.893]*** [2.869]*** [0.046]*** [-1.047] [1.353] 
LOANLOSS 0.38% 0.47% 0.55% 0.47% 0.38% 0.55% 0.54% 0.38% 0.53% 0.54% 0.91% 0.54% 0.53% 0.91% 
 
[-3.328]*** [1.070] [-2.327]** [5.973]*** [-0.142] [1.135] [-1.130] 
         0.001% 0.043% 0.38% 0.043% 0.001% 0.38% 
         [-6.452]*** [6.426]*** [-1.110] 
Z         12,241 9,778 13,497 9,778 12,241 13,497 
         [0.514] [0.539] [-0.201] 
Reported are mean values of performance measures and control variables of Mutual Banks (MBs), Privately-Owned Banks (POBs), Government-Owned Banks (GOBs), and listed (LIST) and 
unlisted (NON-LIST) banks, for both the Entire sample and the Listed Banks Subsample. The value in square brackets is the t-statistic for testing the equality of variable means. 
Variables are defined as follows: 
PROFIT the ratio of Operating Profit to Total Earning Assets  
INCOME the ratio of Operating Income to Total Earning Assets  
COSTS the ratio of Operating Costs to Total Earning Assets  
Total Assets the book value of Total Assets in millions of euro 
CAPITAL the ratio of the book value of Equity to Total Assets  
LOANS the ratio of Loans to Total Earning Assets  
LIQUID the ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets  
DEPOSITS the ratio of Retail Deposits to Total Funding  
LOANLOSS the ratio of Loan Loss Provision to Total Loans  
 the annualized monthly standard deviation of Returns on Assets  
Z the Insolvency Risk measure  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 – Regressions of Bank Performances and Risk Measures on Ownership Structure Variables (MB, GOB, LIST, and F_SHARE) 
 Entire sample Listed banks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 
PROFIT PROFIT INCOME INCOME COSTS COSTS LOANLOSS LOANLOSS LOANLOSS LN() LN(Z) 
Intercept -0.0167*** -0.0109** -0.0508*** -0.0385*** -0.0341*** -0.0276*** -0.0048* -0.0025 -0.0015 -4.7698*** 1.8858 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (1.700) (1.631) 
MB  -0.0033***  -0.0060***  -0.0027***  -0.0009*** 0.0001 -0.9316*** 0.1025 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.177) (0.170) 
GOB  -0.0020**  -0.0052***  -0.0032***  0.0015*** 0.0014*** -0.3831 -0.6102** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.288) (0.276) 
LIST  0.0004  0.0016*  0.0012**  0.0009***    
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)    
F_SHARE         -0.0011** -0.5867*** 0.7419*** 
         
(0.000) (0.197) (0.189) 
GDP 0.0936*** 0.0952*** 0.1186** 0.1209** 0.0250 0.0257 0.03068* 0.02852 0.0232 -0.0292 0.0077 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.051) (0.049) (0.032) (0.031) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.059) (0.057) 
SIZE 0.0009*** 0.0005** 0.0018*** 0.0010*** 0.0009*** 0.0005** 0.00036*** 0.00009 0.0001 -0.039 0.0401 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.054) (0.051) 
LOANS 0.0077*** 0.0066** 0.0301*** 0.0281*** 0.0225*** 0.0215*** 0.00007 0.0011 0.0016 -2.1502*** 1.4670** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.709) (0.680) 
LIQUID -0.0012 -0.0012 0.0157*** 0.0164*** 0.0169*** 0.0176*** 0.00332* 0.0042** 0.0016 -1.4976* 0.9419 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.0018) (0.002) (0.002) (0.788) (0,756) 
DEPOSITS -0.0010 0.0005 0.0095*** 0.0123*** 0.0105*** 0.0118*** 0.00073 0.0010 0.0019** 1.3964*** -0.6525* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.369) (0.354) 
CAPITAL 0.1314*** 0.1390*** 0.2737*** 0.2901*** 0.1424*** 0.1510*** 0.01834** 0.0180** 0.0227** 1.8284 9.2204 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013) (0.0077) (0.008) (0.010) (3.089) (2.963) 
LOANLOSS 0.2927*** 0.2611*** 0.7624*** 0.7061*** 0.4697*** 0.4451***      
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.085) (0.083) (0.054) (0.053)      
Adjusted R2 0.3740 0.3953‡ 0.5560 0.5820‡ 0.5510 0.5693‡ 0.1914 0.2131‡ 0.2311 0.8585 0.8320 
N 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086 1,086 1.086 1.086 800 386 386 
F-statistics (Wald) 
H0: MB=GOB 
 1.98  0.31  0.29  21.08*** 4.09** 2.67 4.90** 
Reported are regression coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis). Variables are defined as follows: 
PROFIT the ratio of Operating Profit to Total Earning Assets  
INCOME the ratio of Operating Income to Total Earning Assets  
COSTS the ratio of Operating Costs to Total Earning Assets  
LOANLOSS the ratio of Loan Loss Provision to Total Loans 
LN() the Log of annualized monthly standard deviation of Returns on Assets  
LN(Z) the Log of Insolvency Risk measure  
MB a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a MB and zero otherwise  
GOB a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a GOB and zero otherwise  
LIST a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is listed and zero otherwise  
F_SHARE the ownership percentage held by the first shareholder 
GDP the national GDP growth rate 
SIZE the Log of Total Assets  
LOANS the ratio of Loans to Total Earning Assets  
LIQUID the ratio of Liquid Assets to Total Assets  
DEPOSITS the ratio of Retail Deposits to Total Funding  
CAPITAL the ratio of the book value of Equity to Total Assets  
We also include year and country variables. We do not report these variables coefficients for ease of exposition. Reported are also the F-statistics of a Wald test for the equality of MB and GOB coefficients. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
In columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, ‡ indicates statistical significance at the 1% level of a joint F-test for the coefficients of MB, GOB, and LIST. 
